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CENTRAL

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
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Pakistan: President Ayub is encountering his first serious overt opposition following the arrest of former Prime Minister Suhrawardy for opposing the constitution which Ayub plans to promulgate in a few weeks. The opposition appears to be confined, thus far, to East Pakistan, Suhrawardy's home territory. Growing agitation among East Pakistani university students forced Ayub to cancel scheduled appearances there and led to student rioting on 6 February. Although most other politically conscious elements sympathize with the student agitation, they may be reluctant to join in open opposition to the government, which still operates under martial law. The current unrest, even if limited, will be politically damaging at a time when Ayub is about to launch a new "constitutional" government.

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Yugoslavia - UAR - Nonaligned States: At their 5 February meeting in Cairo, Tito and Nasir considered calling another conference of nonaligned states to discuss economic collaboration. According to Cairo radio, they decided to obtain the views of other leaders, such as Nehru, Nkrumah, and Sukarno, on holding a conference. Tito would like to see the nonaligned states coordinate their foreign trade policies and present a common front to the Common Market and to the bloc's CEMA. Tito's efforts along this line, at his mid-November meeting with Nasir and Nehru in Cairo, evoked little positive response from the Indian leader.

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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The United States Intelligence Board has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 25 January through 6 February 1962:

1. We continue to feel that major decisions on Berlin have yet to be made by the Soviet leaders. Moscow has indicated an interest in continuing the US-Soviet bilateral talks, in attempting to draw the British into similar talks, and also in encouraging Bonn to engage in separate discussions. This general attitude suggests that the USSR has not ruled out the possibility of reaching an agreed solution on Berlin, and that this remains preferable to a separate peace treaty with East Germany. We believe, therefore, that Moscow probably will be content with diplomatic probing in the next several weeks.

2. During the period under review the situation in Berlin shows a relatively low level of harassments and access delays with some increase in the Communist potential for major interference with access, particularly along the autobahn. The East Germans have erected what appear to be customs sheds and guard shacks at all seven of the East - West Berlin sector-border crossing points; Soviet troops have established observation posts adjacent to five of these same points. During the past two weeks, there have been no reports of Soviet foot patrols along the sector and zonal borders of the city, but the Soviet forces and/or East Germans now man at least 113 watchtowers, plus tree huts and rooftop aeries, which ring West Berlin. The "battle of the loudspeakers" has flared anew, briefly, at the border, but both East and West Berlin authorities are reluctant to engage in the type of all-out propaganda exchange which was typical of last fall and the early winter. Though subject to minor delays and even a few turnbacks, West Germans continue to enter East Berlin with relative ease; West Berliners--except for a few thousand who are employed regularly in the East--are

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unable to do so. Since 1 February, the East Germans have required non-Allied foreign nationals entering and leaving East Berlin via Friedrichstrasse to submit to currency controls. Permanent, hinged steel beams have now been installed at both ends of the autobahn with spikes thought capable of piercing any conventional tire. Allied trains, particularly of the US, are subject to regular delays; Reichsbahn authorities several times in the past weeks have insisted on dropping inbound freight cars on the grounds that the gross weight of the train in question exceeded the braking capacity of available engines.

3. The regime appears to have made a decision to continue interzonal trade with West Germany at about the same level as 1961, although it is pressing ahead with the implementation of plans to decrease dependence on West German products and integrate more closely with the bloc economy. Since the regime is obligated under existing IZT commitments to make a cash settlement of its IZT debts by 30 June--unless the West Germans grant more lenient terms--interzonal trade orders during the first six months of 1962 are likely to be on a selective basis, emphasizing such items as special steels.

4. The regime's implementation of its general conscription law--all youths born between 1940 and 1943 on 5 February received orders to register between 12 February and 5 March--has evoked widespread criticism among all classes of the East German population, mainly in the name of moral principles ("shooting at West German brothers"), but as yet there is no evidence of overt resistance to the draft. There is also sharpened grumbling about economic conditions, as food shortages--butter, beef, milk and potatoes--worsen. There are indications of official concern over continuing public disaffection, evidenced by occasional acts of violence, circulation of antiregime leaflets, etc., but the situation appears to be in hand. [REDACTED]

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

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No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

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BERLIN: Communist military activity does not suggest that the Communists expect to risk military confrontation over Berlin in the immediate future.

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SOUTH VIETNAM: Although counteractions by government forces continue to show some success, the Viet Cong continues its subversive and small-scale military activity and retains its capability to conduct large-scale attacks on preselected targets in some areas of the country at any time. The Viet Cong has expanded its propaganda directed at enlisting broader popular support.

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East Pakistani Students Agitate Against Ayub Regime

Ayub faces a number of difficult choices in his efforts to retain complete control after he restores "constitutional" government and holds elections. By arresting a potential rival who still has a substantial popular following, particularly in East Pakistan, Ayub has sparked some of the very opposition he had hoped to prevent.

The Bengals of East Pakistan have long complained that the central government is dominated by West Pakistanis who discriminate against them. Although Ayub has paid special attention to the needs of East Pakistan and tried to strengthen support for his regime there, East Pakistani politicians want to return to parliamentary government rather than accept the strongly centralized presidential system planned by Ayub.

The university students of East Pakistan chronically agitate against whatever leaders are in power, but until now have been afraid to protest openly against Ayub's martial-law regime. Even though politically conscious elements share the students' sentiments, the bulk of the population may not. Ayub probably hopes he can curb the students without resorting to harsh methods which could alienate the potentially friendly or neutral masses.

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The Vice President

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Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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